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ABSTRACT
In an era of copyright trolling, digital distribution, and
widespread reappropriation of creative works, the specter of
“shakedown” copyright infringement litigation looms larger than
ever before. Some plaintiffs will hold the prospect of expensive
and time-consuming discovery over alleged infringers to provoke
settlement. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, courts are more
likely to consider the costs and time requirements of discovery
when considering a defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Several courts have recently indicated a willingness to grant
motions to dismiss in copyright infringement cases when discovery
is unlikely to produce material evidence. This Article examines the
circumstances under which pre-discovery dismissal is likely to be
granted, the courts’ reasoning for granting dismissal in such
cases, and the potential effects on copyright infringement
litigation.

*1 Evan Brown, University of Washington, Class of 2014. Special thanks to
Professors Zahr Said and Lea Vaughn of the University of Washington School
of Law, and to Robert F. Sinclair, Nick Kajka, and Caitlin Forsyth for their
helpful edits and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
In an era when costly copyright infringement suits are often
initiated to provoke settlements, pre-discovery dismissal is
appealing to defendants and courts alike. Pleading rules previously
made it difficult to convince a judge to dismiss the case before
discovery was allowed, but in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
groundbreaking decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, certain types of copyright infringement suits are
excellent candidates for pre-discovery dismissal. In particular,
cases in which the court need only compare works of authorship to
determine whether the plaintiff’s claims are plausible. Such cases
can be appropriately controlled with pre-discovery dispositive
motions. Yet such motions will usually require courts to interpret
and compare works, a task that carries certain costs.
This Article examines the circumstances under which a court is
likely to consider dismissal of a copyright infringement case
without discovery or trial and the pitfalls defendants may face in
moving to dismiss. Part I describes the procedure and standards for
pre-discovery dismissal. Part II explains how defendants in
copyright infringement cases should challenge the elements of a
prima facie case for infringement and prevail on defenses to
infringement on a motion to dismiss. Part III presents four cases
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that illustrate an emerging trend toward pre-discovery dismissal of
infringement cases in certain circumstances, particularly where
comparison of works is sufficient to resolve the claims and the suit
appears calculated to provoke settlement. Finally, Part IV
introduces some of the procedural problems presented by prediscovery dismissal based on judicial comparison of works.
I.

PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL GENERALLY

The Twombly standard has given courts the opportunity to
more easily resolve cases at a very early stage in the litigation
process. Defendants who wish to avoid discovery can move to
dismiss or request judgment on the pleadings where additional
evidence will prove immaterial. The primary vehicle for dismissal
is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but
motions for judgment on the pleadings and even motions for
summary judgment may accomplish the same result in certain
cases. Because the plausibility standard requires plaintiffs to plead
allegations that illustrate what sort of evidence will be necessary to
resolve the claims, pre-discovery dismissal has become a feasible
strategy.
A. Procedural Considerations
A defendant who hopes to avoid the expense and
inconvenience of discovery can either move for dismissal before
filing the responsive pleading or move for judgment on the
pleadings. If the defendant has no need to plead additional facts, a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is appropriate. 2 If a
response has been filed, the defendant can instead move for
judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c). 3 If the moving
party relies on information not included in the filed pleadings, the
court will convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary
judgment. Such a conversion is important to a defendant seeking to
avoid discovery, because discovery requests are allowed as part of
2
3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
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a motion for summary judgment. 4 However, the court has
discretion to grant or deny any such discovery request. Thus, prediscovery dismissal requires a successful 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion,
or a successful argument at the summary judgment stage that
discovery is unnecessary.
A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the plaintiff’s claim against
the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether the case
can succeed. One important advantage of a 12(b)(6) motion is that
the defendant can potentially end the suit without even responding
to the complaint. A major drawback, however, is that the defendant
cannot argue facts extrinsic to the complaint. 5 Thus, affirmative
defenses generally cannot be raised on a 12(b)(6) motion. 6 There
is, however, an important exception to this general rule: If the
complaint includes all facts necessary for the defendant to
“conclusively establish” the defense, it may be raised. 7 As the First
Circuit described the exception, “dismissal . . . is appropriate when
the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a
meritorious affirmative defense.” 8 That is, the complaint must
include all facts necessary for the defendant to establish every
4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2). Further, a non-movant who believes he was
denied an opportunity to conduct necessary discovery prior to summary
judgment may appeal on grounds that summary judgment was premature. Vance
By & Through Hammons v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1148 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“The general rule is that summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is
not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery.”); but see Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding in a trade dress infringement case that denial of a discovery
request aimed at producing unnecessary evidence was not error).
5
E.g., Pegasus Holdings v. Veterinary Centers of America, Inc., 38 F.
Supp.2d 1158, 1159–60 (C.D.Cal.1998).
6
United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005).
7
In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003).
8
Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996);
accord C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir.
2012); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Iowa Pub.
Employees' Ret. Sys. v. MF Global, Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2010);
Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir.
2010); Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 2009);
Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005); Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161
(3d Cir. 2001); Pentagen Technologies Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1003,
1005 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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element of the defense. 9 Statute of limitations or immunity
defenses are often raised pursuant to this exception, 10 but the
exception can also be invoked to assert copyright defenses like fair
use. 11
Documents and other works, usually central to copyright
infringement cases, can be included among the facts of the
complaint in several ways. The plaintiff can incorporate documents
into the complaint by attachment. 12 The court can also take judicial
notice of matters of public record and common public
knowledge. 13 Most importantly, the defendant can ask the court to
incorporate by reference works that are central to the allegations in
the complaint but have not been attached, so long as there are not
material issues of fact relating to their authenticity. 14 A court is
9

A plaintiff is not required to anticipate affirmative defenses and plead
facts sufficient to defeat them. Only if the elements of the affirmative defense
can be established from the factual allegations in the complaint can it be raised
on a 12(b)(6) motion. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir.
2007). The Twombly decision did not alter this requirement. Id.
10
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.
2012); see also Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., 2:10-CV-1036LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 4115413 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010).
11
See Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690.
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v.
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010); McCready v. eBay, Inc.,
453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir. 2006); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &
Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555, n.19 (9th Cir. 1989); Amfac Mortg. Corp. v.
Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1978).
13
Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2); Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646,
649 (9th Cir. 1988); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th
Cir. 1986). Note that judicial notice may also be taken of “generic elements of
creative works,” Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128 (C.D.
Cal. 2007), publicly accessible works, Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1082, 1084, n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001), and even well-known songs, Burnett v.
Twentieth Century Fox, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D.Cal. 2007).
14
E.g., Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Services, Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 797 (6th
Cir. 2012); Citadel Group Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580,
591 (7th Cir. 2012); Greenpack of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, 684
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2012); Kensington Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v.
Montgomery County, Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); Lee v. City of
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d
699, 705 (9th Cir. 1998); but see Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 12-30183, 2012
WL 4902809 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2012) (stating that the “one recognized
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especially likely to grant such a request to incorporate when the
work is all that is necessary for the court to consider whether the
complaint states a valid claim. 15 Many district courts have held
that works at issue in a copyright infringement case are good
candidates for such incorporation by the defendant, 16 and at least
one circuit court has written approvingly of liberally applying the
incorporation by reference doctrine in copyright infringement
cases. 17
Of course, affirmative defenses can also be raised in the
defendant’s responsive pleading. If this is necessary, pre-discovery
dismissal is still possible through a 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings. 18 Any works at issue may be attached to the
responsive pleading. This may be a useful tactic if the defendant
wishes to assert defenses, like fair use, that can benefit from
information not contained in the complaint, including other works
not obviously at the heart of the claims. As with a 12(b)(6) motion,
if information extrinsic to the pleadings is necessary or if
documents external to the pleadings are attached, the court will
convert the motion to one for summary judgment. A court may
effectively convert the motion even if the pleadings contain all
necessary evidence. 19
exception” to the rule that external documents may not be considered as part of a
12(b)(6) motion was for documents incorporated by reference).
15
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by
reference a prospectus upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the
complaint, the defendant may produce the prospectus when attacking the
complaint for its failure to state a claim, because plaintiff should not so easily be
allowed to escape the consequences of its own failure.”).
16
Erickson v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1134 (D. Or. 2012); Campbell
v. Walt Disney Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); Int'l Audiotext Network,
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995); Canal Image UK Ltd.
v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Zella, 529 F. Supp. 2d at
1131–32; Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121–22 (N.D.Cal. 2002).
17
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.
2012) (noting in dictum that incorporation of works like television programs,
which cannot be physically attached as documents, “makes eminently good
sense”).
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
19
E.g., Swatch Group Mgmt. Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 11 CIV.
1006 AKH, 2012 WL 1759944 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012).
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If a Rule 12 motion is converted to a motion for summary
judgment, the court must provide notice to the parties and an
opportunity to present evidence consistent with FRCP 56.20 As
noted above, the court may entertain discovery requests in
conjunction with a motion for summary judgment, 21 but any
requests should be denied if evidence sufficient to dispose of the
case is already in front of court. 22 This is especially true in the case
of converted Rule 12 motions. 23 Courts are also likely to deny
discovery requests that are unduly burdensome under the
circumstances. 24 Thus, depending on the circumstances of the case
and the facts already before the court, a converted motion for
summary judgment may not present major practical distinction
from either a 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion. 25
B. Standard for Dismissal
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Twombly, a court would
only grant pre-discovery dismissal when it was “beyond doubt that
the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” 26 This standard required that it
20

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S. Ct. 1195, 89 L. Ed. 2d 310
(1986).
21
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from
any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except . .
. when authorized by these rules”) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b)(2) (“[T]he court
may . . . allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.”);
see also Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691.
22
Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691 (“District courts need not, and indeed ought
not, allow discovery when it is clear that the case turns on facts already in
evidence.”)
23
Swatch Group Mgmt. Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 11 CIV. 1006
AKH, 2012 WL 1759944 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012).
24
Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691.
25
Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) specifically gives courts
the discretion to accept and consider extrinsic materials offered in connection
with these motions, and to convert the motion to one for summary judgment
when a party has notice that the district court may look beyond the pleadings.”)
26
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–6, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957).
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be impossible for the plaintiff to prove his case on the basis of the
allegations made in the complaint, making pre-discovery dismissal
very difficult. 27 The Twombly decision lowered the bar for
defendants, requiring that plaintiffs plead sufficient factual
circumstances to make the claim plausible. 28 Prior to the Twombly
decision, a defendant had to show impossibility in order to prevail
on a motion to dismiss; after Twombly, a defendant need only
establish implausibility.
The Court’s reasoning in Twombly relied heavily on its
assessment that judicial management of the discovery process was
often an inadequate check on abusive discovery in antitrust suits.29
Justice will often prove elusive if “the threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases
before reaching those proceedings,” and such a situation actually
incentivizes unmeritorious claims. In order to better protect
defendants from the threat of unduly burdensome discovery
requests, the Court determined that the complaint must push the
claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 30
As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, this standard should be
applied “such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to
be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued
litigation.” 31 The Supreme Court clarified in Iqbal that the
plausibility standard applied to all civil actions,32 but the warning
of Twombly was that courts should scrutinize plausibility when
claims are especially prone to abusive litigation.
27

See, e.g., Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328
(2d Cir. 2005) (vacating dismissal because the plaintiff might prove validity of
copyright on several possible grounds, and noting that the court could properly
determine a lack of validity as a matter of law “at any of several later stages”).
28
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
29
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of
a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the
discovery process through ‘careful case management,’ [citation omitted] given
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”)
30
Id., at 570.
31
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 2012).
32
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
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Courts have long viewed copyright infringement cases as prone
to abuse because plaintiffs are often simply trying to cash in on the
success of a later work to which they did not directly contribute. 33
This has become an even larger problem with the emerging trend
of copyright trolling—purchasing copyrights from the original
holders in order to enforce them against infringers for profit. 34 The
Seventh Circuit noted that “[r]uinous discovery heightens the
incentive to settle rather than defend these frivolous suits.” 35 This
potential for abuse looms large over infringement suits, and courts
have begun to take into account the extent that particular claims
appear to be shots across the bow intended to provoke surrender in
the face of unjustifiable costs.
II. PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
CASES
There are two situations in which a court may grant dismissal
of a copyright infringement claim. First, a defendant may
challenge the complaint because a required element of
infringement cannot be established on the basis of the averments.
Second, a defendant may assert a defense that relies solely on
pleaded facts and works before the court. Under certain
circumstances, even fair use may be established without need for
evidence external to the pleadings.

33

See, e.g., Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (noting
that it is “usual in plagiarism cases” that “obscurity is taking a long shot at
success”); Porto v. Guirgis, 659 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting
that a belated suit of questionable merit against successful filmmakers and
producers had “the hallmarks of an abusive lawsuit”).
34
See, e.g., Third Degree Films v. Does 1-47, 286 F.R.D. 188 (D. Mass.
2012); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, CIV.A. 113995 DRH, 2012 WL 1570765 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1, 288 F.R.D.
233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
35
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.
2012).
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A. Challenges to Prima Facie Showing of Infringement
The most common method for disposing of copyright
infringement cases prior to discovery is moving to dismiss because
the plaintiff cannot plausibly establish one or more elements of her
claim. If any of the elements of copyright infringement cannot be
established by the facts as averred in the complaint, a court will
dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim. These elements
are (1) registration of copyright, (2) validity of copyright, (3)
copying, and (4) substantial similarity between the allegedly
infringing work and the copyrighted elements of the original
work. 36 Challenging registration or validity prior to discovery may
be relatively simple in some cases, but the copying and substantial
similarity elements will usually require at least comparison of the
works.
1. Copying
Copying can be established in two ways: by offering direct
proof that the defendant actually copied the copyrighted work, or
by offering circumstantial evidence from which the factfinder can
infer that copying occurred. The former method requires witness
testimony or other evidence, and thus is not suited to pre-discovery
dismissal. The latter method allows the court to infer that the
defendant copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted expression if the
plaintiff establishes both (1) that the defendant had access to the
work, and (2) that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work. 37 The similarity finding generally
36

See Howard B. Abrams, 2 The Law of Copyright § 14:6 (2013).
E.g., Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508
(7th Cir. 1994). Some courts helpfully refer to the substantial similarity portion
of a copying analysis as involving “probative similarity” to differentiate it from
the substantial similarity evaluation used to determine whether the defendant has
appropriated a sufficient amount of the copyrighted work to constitute
infringement. See, e.g., Soc'y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v.
Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351
F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, n.7
(5th Cir. 2003); Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 290 F.3d
548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002); Peel & Co., Inc. v. The Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 394
(5th Cir. 2001); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d
37
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requires the factfinder to examine the works, treating
parallels “that, in the normal course of events, would not be
expected to arise independently in the two works” as
circumstantial evidence of copying. 38
If the plaintiff can provide no direct evidence of copying, a
court will dismiss an infringement claim if it determines the works
at issue do not exhibit similarities from which a rational jury could
infer copying. 39 If there are no similarities between the works at
all, the determination is relatively simple. 40 If there are some
similarities between the works, the court may still infer lack of
copying if it finds that the similarities would not indicate to
rational jurors that copying occurred. For example, similarities
that extend only to common influences or scènes à faire may not
lead to rational inferences of copying. 41
2. Substantial Similarity
In addition to possibly considering similarity as circumstantial
evidence of copying, the court will assess similarity to determine
whether the defendant’s copying is substantial enough to constitute
actionable infringement. This similarity determination involves a
somewhat different analysis than that required to establish
copying, as it requires the court to determine whether a substantial
enough portion of the expression protected by copyright has been
taken, and thus whether the copying should be considered
infringement of that copyright. 42 The question presented is not
Cir. 1997); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
38
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 370
(5th Cir. 2004) (abrogated on other grounds).
39
Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 2007).
40
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (“[I]f there are no similarities, no amount of
evidence of access will suffice to prove copying.”)
41
See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).
42
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975)
(“While ‘(r)ose is a rose is a rose is a rose,’ substantial similarity is not always
substantial similarity.”). However, courts have at times conflated the two
analyses. See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 538 (2d
Cir. 1938); Ornstein v. Paramount Productions, 9 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y.
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whether the similarities can lead a jury to infer anything about the
defendant’s process of creation; rather, the question is whether the
amount and manner of appropriation of copyrighted content is
sufficient to constitute infringement. This question is answered
primarily by comparing the defendant’s work to the protected
elements of the plaintiff’s work, although expert testimony to
provide context or explanation may be relevant. If the defendant
copied only unprotected elements—for example, portions of works
in the public domain or abstract ideas—there can be no finding of
infringement. 43 Similarly, if the defendant’s use of protected
material is clearly de minimis, the court should not find
infringement. 44
Substantial similarity is essentially a qualitative factual
determination made by comparing the works at issue. The
particular method of assessment differs among the circuits, but in
all jurisdictions the factfinder must make a determination about an
ordinary observer’s reactions. 45 While this sort of determination is
particularly well suited to a jury, judges are sometimes willing to
find that their own reactions are sufficiently ordinary to stand in
for those of any reasonable juror. 46 Indeed, as far back as 1932, the
1935).
43

Christianson v. West Pub. Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Carr v.
Nat'l Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
44
Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
1997); DeBitetto v. Alpha Books, 7 F. Supp. 2d 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
45
The appellate courts have developed different approaches to substantial
similarity, but each involves some use of an ordinary observer/intended
audience test. The Second Circuit’s approach, also followed by the Third, Fifth,
and Seventh circuits, is to use an “intrinsic test” by which the court decides
whether an ordinary observer would apprehend protected elements of the
copyrighted work in the defendant’s work. The Ninth Circuit approach, used
also by the Fourth and Eighth circuits, adds to the intrinsic test an “extrinsic
test” by which the court compares elements of the works to determine whether
there is “a triable issue of fact.” Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th
Cir. 1990). Finally, the Sixth Circuit uses a somewhat different two-step
approach, first determining which elements of the copyrighted work are
protected, and then comparing only those elements with the defendant’s work
under an ordinary observer standard.
46
E.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Development Corp.,
602 F.3d 57, 64, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 2010); Gal v. Viacom Intern., Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwave
Co., 207 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000); Blakeman v. The Walt Disney Co., 613 F.
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District Court for the Southern District of New York—no stranger
to copyright infringement suits—announced that pre-trial
comparison by the judge “should become the usual method of
dealing with copyright suits, unless, owing to nice questions of
originality or access, oral evidence is indicated as necessary.” 47 In
these cases, the judge’s comparison of the works proves effectively
dispositive, often prior to trial.
Yet for some works, substantial similarity cannot be
appropriately determined prior to trial. For instance, some courts
have held that an understanding of certain types of copyrightable
material, particularly computer software, is beyond the realm of
ordinary jurors’ experience, and thus expert testimony is necessary
to find substantial similarity. 48 Works intended for specialized
audiences will also generally require expert testimony before the
factfinder can fully comprehend the implications of any
similarities. 49 In general, though, expert testimony is not required
to decide substantial similarity. 50 In fact, some courts consider
expert testimony “not appropriate” to an analysis of an ordinary
observer’s response. 51
In order to determine substantial similarity, it is important that
the court have before it the all of the works at issue. If it does not,
pre-discovery dismissal is inappropriate. For example, a synopsis
of the infringing work will not be sufficient, as the court needs
Supp. 2d 288, 298, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1637 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
47
Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); accord Park v.
Warner Bros., 8 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); see also Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). Note, however, that these cases
predated the development of the modern tests for determining substantial
similarity.
48
E.g., Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d
Cir. 1992); accord Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 65.
49
E.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990);
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003).
50
E.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004).
51
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Notably, however, this case has been
criticized by commentators as confusing the prior case law. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 719 (2010).
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further evidence to determine whether the synopsis is truly
representative of the full work. 52 So long as the works are before
the court, however, either by attachment to the pleadings or
incorporation by reference, wholly dissimilar works or works in
which similarity extends only to unprotected elements are good
candidates for pre-discovery dismissal. 53
B. Affirmative Defenses
An affirmative defense can also be grounds for pre-discovery
dismissal, so long as evidence beyond the scope of the filed
pleadings is not necessary to fully consider the merits of the
defense. If the defense appears on the face of the complaint or is
raised in the defendant’s answer, the court may consider it. Certain
defenses, like the statute of limitations, may lend themselves well
to pre-discovery dismissal but are unlikely to appear on the face of
the complaint. Other defenses, like laches, estoppel, and
abandonment, will almost certainly necessitate introduction of
evidence external to the pleadings. Fair use, the most prevalent
infringement defense, often also requires additional evidence to
establish. Under certain circumstances, however, fair use may be
considered to appear on the face of the complaint if the works can
be incorporated and if the complaint indicates no external evidence
will be material. In such cases, comparison of the works may be all
that is necessary for the court to resolve the issue of fair use.
Fair use has long been viewed as generally unsuitable to prediscovery motions. 54 In analyzing fair use, courts attempt to
determine whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work was
non-competitive or transformative enough to justify a nonpermissive use, in which case otherwise infringing copying may be
permissible. Normally, courts accomplish this by using the
52

See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
See Cory Van Rijn, Inc. v. California Raisin Advisory Bd., 697 F. Supp.
1136, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 140 F.
Supp. 707, 708 (S.D.Cal.1956); Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484, 485
(S.D.W. Va. 1952); Lowenfels, 2 F. Supp. at 74.
54
E.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)
(Hand, J.) (“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright, and ought not to be resolved in cases where it may turn out to be
moot, unless the advantage is very plain.”).
53
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balancing test outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 107, weighing at least (1) the
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the entirety of the copyrighted work, and (4) the effect
of the use on the market for the copyrighted work. Such a
balancing test is poorly suited to pre-discovery dismissal in most
cases. In particular, the fourth factor can be heavily dependent on
the evidence presented by the parties.
Whether dismissal on fair use grounds is appropriate will hinge
on whether the complaint includes allegations from which the
court can infer that other evidence is reasonably likely to have an
impact on the fair use analysis. 55 For example, if the plaintiff has
alleged actual economic harm or facts indicating potential future
harm, pre-discovery dismissal on fair use grounds will probably
not be appropriate. In such a case, the court is highly unlikely to
find that the fair use defense appears on the face of the complaint,
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings would probably prove
futile. In many cases, all elements other than market effect are
clear after comparing the works and considering the factual
allegations made in the complaint.
Parody, a classic but legally complicated transformational use,
provides an illustrative example of the issues associated with fair
use. Usually, the analysis will hinge on the third and fourth fair use
factors—the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying,
and the effect on the market for the plaintiff’s work. 56 In fact, the
factors are often melded when courts examine parodies, since a
parody will only be found to have copied an impermissible amount
of the copyrighted work if it is likely to be a “market substitute.” 57
If it is not a market substitute, it is very difficult to prove market
55

Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.
2012); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 40
L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974) (“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a
complaint . . . [t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”).
56
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588, 114 S. Ct. 1164,
1176, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW, 515 (5th ed. 2010).
57
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.

84

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:2

impact. 58 Further, if the effect of the parody on demand for the
copyrighted work is clearly or admittedly neutral at worst and
positive at best, the court may be willing to find fair use without
further evidence. 59 If these factors can be clearly resolved by the
court without further evidence, the court may well dismiss the
case. 60 These considerations will be especially important to a court
considering fair use as a matter of law prior to discovery.
III. CASE STUDIES IN PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL
Four cases decided within the last several years may serve as
guideposts for understanding when a court is likely to dismiss a
copyright infringement case in the post-Twombly/Iqbal era. Both
the District Court 61 and Seventh Circuit 62 opinions in Brownmark
Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners are instructive, as they showcase
the issues associated with the incorporation of works and the
determination of whether a defense appears on the face of the
complaint when works are so incorporated. On the other hand, the
2008 Sixth Circuit case of National Business Development
Services, Inc. v. American Credit Education & Consulting Inc.
illuminates the potential for dismissal when the plaintiff fails to
describe the works at issue with sufficient specificity to allow for
incorporation. In the 2010 case Righthaven LLC v. Realty One
Group, Inc., a District Court dismissed an infringement case by a
copyright troll company on fair use grounds, which may be
indicative of how courts will treat similar cases. Finally, the 2010
Second Circuit case Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone
Development Corp. exemplifies the type of case that a court is
likely to consider ripe for substantial similarity analysis at the
12(b)(6) stage. These cases illustrate the sorts of procedural,
factual, and equitable scenarios in which courts may be inclined to
58

Id. at 591–2 (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the
Copyright Act.”)
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D.
Wis. 2011).
62
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.
2012).
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dismiss infringement claims.
The District Court’s opinion in Brownmark illustrates the
difficulties that can arise when attempting to determine whether
evidence external to the pleadings is necessary when the works at
issue are appropriately before the court. 63 The plaintiffs, creators
of a viral YouTube video, sued the producers of the television
comedy show South Park for parodying the video in an episode.
The complaint alleged that the defendants had infringed by
including the parody in the episode and it did not allege any
separate incidents of infringement—for example, in advertisements
or other promotional materials—despite having opportunities to
amend both before and after the defendants moved to dismiss. The
episode was thus central to the claim and could be attached to the
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s copyrighted video was similarly
incorporated by reference. Once both works were before the court,
the judge decided that all of the standard fair use factors could be
analyzed without additional evidence: the video was clearly a
commercially released parody, the defendant had not taken more of
the copyrighted work than was reasonably necessary to accomplish
its purpose, and the parody was not similar enough to the original
to usurp market demand. The court thus ruled that no further
evidence would help the plaintiff prevail against the defense of fair
use. 64
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, conspicuously commenting that
“infringement suits are often baseless shakedowns.” 65 The court
approved of the resolution through comparison, but held that the
motion to dismiss should have been treated as one for summary
judgment. Still, the court saw no need to remand since it believed
that any discovery requests would simply have been denied and
failure to provide notice of conversion was irrelevant because the
63

Brownmark, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
Id.. At least one court has distinguished Brownmark on this basis,
implying that if a plaintiff raises factual allegations that indicate that other
evidence may impact one or more of the fair use factors, mere comparison of the
works will be insufficient grounds for dismissal before the plaintiff has an
opportunity to offer such evidence. Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314,
1316–7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2012).
65
Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691 (7th Cir. 2012).
64
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plaintiff could not have offered any contrary evidence. Under the
circumstances, the court found no effective difference between the
two types of motions since comparison so clearly established fair
use. In its estimation, all that was required to dispose of the case
were the works themselves, whether they were incorporated by
reference or offered on motion for summary judgment. By
describing the works at issue in the complaint with particularity,
but without pleading facts that made additional evidence
necessary, the plaintiff had opened itself to dismissal without
discovery.
Yet if a plaintiff fails to describe the infringing works with
sufficient particularity, closing the door on pre-discovery
comparison, the court may simply dismiss the case for failure to
meet the plausibility standard. In National Business Development
Services, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds that the
case was nothing more than a fishing expedition intended to
uncover implausible acts of infringement through unnecessary
discovery. 66 The plaintiff had sued thirteen defendants for
infringement but described only in the most general terms the types
of publications that allegedly infringed its copyrighted materials.
The court held that such allegations were insufficient under the
Twombly standard, noting also that “[c]opyright infringement . . .
lends itself readily to abusive litigation, since the high cost of
trying such a case can force a defendant who might otherwise be
successful in trial to settle in order to avoid the time and
expenditure of a resource intensive case.” 67
Courts may be especially sensitive to cases involving copyright
trolls. In Righthaven, the court considered whether a real estate
blogger’s use of a portion of a newspaper article constituted fair
use. 68 Plaintiff Righthaven, “the first copyright troll,” 69 had
purchased the copyright to the article from the newspaper after the
defendant had published the reproduced portion. Instead of settling
66

Nat'l Bus. Dev. Services, Inc. v. Am. Credit Educ. & Consulting Inc., 299
F. App'x 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2008).
67
Id. at 512.
68
Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., 2:10-CV-1036-LRH-PAL,
2010 WL 4115413 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010)
69
Ian Polonsky, You Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and
Copyright Trolling on the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71 (2012).
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quickly, as most others targeted by Righthaven had done, the
defendant raised fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion and the court
granted dismissal. While the court’s brief opinion does not mention
abusive litigation, the defendant argued in his motion to dismiss
that the suit was intended as a source of revenue. Righthaven had
not even sent the customary cease-and-desist letter prior to
initiating the suit. It is unclear what persuasive value this had, but
it is notable that the same court dismissed all of Righthaven’s
similar suits as well, concluding fair use in some of them. 70 In
cases such as this in which equitable considerations loom large, the
court may be particularly receptive to dismissal.
Even if the suit does not appear abusive or intended to provoke
settlement by threat of expensive litigation, a court may be willing
to protect the defendant from unnecessary expense if the works at
issue are before it and it believes that external evidence is
superfluous. For example, in Peter F. Gaito Architecture, the
Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal on substantial similarity
grounds, holding that the similarity between two architectural
designs could be properly determined as a matter of law after
visual comparison. 71 Moreover, the court explained that a de novo
comparison of the works by the appellate court is the proper
procedure for determining whether the lower court ruling was in
error. 72
In each of these cases, the facts suggested that it was “unfair to
require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of
discovery and continued litigation.” 73 However, in each case the
court also felt that information extrinsic to the complaint would not
have changed the disposition on the merits. As the Second Circuit
put it, the plaintiff was not “entitled to offer evidence in support of

70

See, e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. June
20, 2011).
71
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57 (2d
Cir. 2010).
72
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66; see also, Boisson v. Banian,
Ltd, 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer
California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991).
73
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
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his claims.” 74 The lack of plausibility serves as the legal grounds
for dismissal, but where bad motives or indefensible expense are
suggested by the facts of the case, the court may be more open to
early resolution of the case.
IV. THE COSTS OF PRE-DISCOVERY COMPARISON
Although pre-discovery dismissal diminishes the overt costs of
litigation, there are hidden costs that should also be considered by
the courts. Early dismissal is well suited to cases involving the
sorts of questions that judges are trained to analyze, but there is a
danger to expanding the role of judicial comparison outside the
bounds of judges’ expertise to dispose of infringement cases. Fair
use presents further problems due to the prominence of market
impact in the analysis and the difficulty of inferring such impact
simply by comparing works.
Comparison of works without contextualizing testimony
can suffer from inherent difficulties, some of which may not
always be apparent. For example, substantial similarity frequently
requires an analysis of whether the overall “feel” of two works is
similar, 75 and this “feel” is often quite dramatically affected by
context. 76 This contextual element is generally distorted in an
infringement proceeding. The process of comparison itself may
even convey unintended similarities. 77 Thus, the parties try to
contextualize the works with testimony and other evidence. But
prior to discovery and trial, they have not had a chance to
thoroughly establish context; instead, the judge simply decrees that
his assumed context is correct.
Considering fair use prior to discovery and trial presents a
related problem, as the plaintiff is not allowed to present evidence
of market impact. This impact is often effectively dispositive on
74

Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 65 (quoting the Scheuer
standard, see supra note 55, as stated in Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien,
56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995)).
75
E.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd, 273 F.3d 262, 266 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012).
76
Tushnet, supra note 73, at 734.
77
Id.
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the question of fair use, yet courts seeking to dismiss a seemingly
abusive suit may be tempted to make hasty assumptions. For
example, the Brownmark court held that because the parody at
issue was not a market substitute for the parodied work, it “cannot
have an actionable effect on the potential market for or value of the
original[.]” 78 However, the Supreme Court has held that a parody
may have an actionable impact on the market for protectable
derivative works. 79 Given the recent proliferation of television
programs presenting licensed compilations of YouTube videos, 80
the South Park episode could plausibly have had a negative impact
on the market for licensing to some such programs. A plaintiff
should be allowed to present evidence of such an impact,
especially where the impact on the derivative market is not obvious
to a judge at the time of comparison. 81 The threat of dismissal on
fair use grounds due to the lack of clear market impact effectively
requires infringement plaintiffs to anticipate and plead around the
affirmative defense by pleading such an impact, which is generally
improper. 82
Despite these sorts of problems, courts will likely continue to
push for early dismissal of seemingly abusive infringement suits.
In practice, much will probably depend on the facts of individual
cases. If the likelihood of abusive discovery or settlement extortion
is significant, the potential unfairness of pre-discovery dismissal
may be weighed lightly in the balance. On the other hand, if a suit
78

Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 693.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592, 114 S. Ct. 1164,
127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994).
80
For example, Comedy Central’s Tosh.0, MTV’s Ridiculousness, or
SyFy’s Viral Video Showdown.
81
Notably, the Campbell Court held that “when a lethal parody, like a
scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm
cognizable under the Copyright Act.” 510 U.S. at 591–592. Yet the Court also
explained that “the role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism
[that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps
it.’ [citation omitted]” Id. at 592. In a case such as this—admittedly quite
unusual—in which the derivative market is one for “biting criticism” that brings
licensing fees to the copyright holder, the competition is fairly direct and there
may well be cognizable harm.
82
See generally 5 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1276 (3d ed.).
79
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is not clearly abusive, the problems with reliance on comparison
and assumption caution against early dismissal.
CONCLUSION
Given the requirements of the plausibility standard, judges are
at greater liberty to determine that judicial comparison is sufficient
to resolve a copyright infringement claim. Courts have long
decided infringement cases on summary judgment by simply
comparing the works at issue, but the cases discussed may indicate
a trend toward even earlier dismissal using the same methods. It
appears that the courts in these cases paid particular attention to the
potential for high-cost litigation and discovery abuses and the
resulting incentive to settle unmeritorious cases, sending a message
to defendants that settlement may not be necessary in the face of
“baseless shakedowns.” While there are potentially serious issues
with such early dismissals, and it remains to be seen whether other
courts will adopt this approach, defendants and plaintiffs alike
would be well advised to consider the possibility of pre-discovery
dismissal in any copyright infringement suit, especially those that
threaten expensive and time-consuming discovery.
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PRACTICE POINTERS


If a case appears calculated to provoke settlement and the
plaintiff is unlikely to win on the merits, the defendant may
wish to pursue pre-discovery dismissal.



If comparison of the works at issue will likely prove
sufficient to resolve the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant may
move to dismiss for failure to state a claim rather than
responding and then moving for summary judgment.



If the complaint in a copyright infringement case refers to
the works at issue, the defendant should argue that they
have been incorporated by reference and attach them to a
motion to dismiss.



If the complaint does not refer to the works at issue with
sufficient specificity, the defendant should move to dismiss
for failure to state a claim on grounds that the claim as
pleaded is not plausibly likely to succeed.

